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DEMOCRACY AS CIVIC CONVERSATION 
TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY. By Robert W. Bennett. 1 Cornell University 
Press. Pp. 223. $29.95. 
Louis R. Cohen2 
This elegant book seems more important at the moment 
than its author is willing to claim. Professor Bennett argues that 
the best account of America's democratic institutions is that they 
foster a complex "conversation" about public affairs between the 
citizenry and its leaders. He insists that the aim of his "conversa-
tional perspective" is simply to describe why many features of 
our government have survived and seem to work, and not to 
judge whether they are working well. But his own enthusiasm for 
both American democracy and "democratic conversation" 
shines through, and he surely believes that the democracy works 
well when the conversation is smooth and not bitter, and that 
our most effective leaders are those who can converse most ef-
fectively with the public. 
Bennett has been arguing for a while that the traditional 
primary explanation of American government-that it allows 
the will of a majority of citizens to be reflected through the vot-
ing process in the nation's decisions-is incoherent, inconsistent 
with what happens, and fails to account for central features of 
that government.3 His summary here of the shortcomings of 
"majoritarianism and the vote-centered model" as a description 
of the real world is clear and efficient (pp. 18-33), and the book 
I. Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of 
Law. Professor Bennett served as the school's Dean from 1985 to 1995. 
2. Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington D.C. Mr. 
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3. See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. 
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would be fun to read even if there were only this delicious 
(good-natured) attack on a standard model. 
On the traditional view, at least in its most naive form, the 
views of a majority of citizens dictate policy, not directly (as in 
the legendary New England town meeting) but through the elec-
tion by majority vote of representatives, who in turn make deci-
sions by majority votes within their representative bodies, and 
the election of a President, again by majority vote, to take care 
that the policies are faithfully executed. 
This is, of course, not merely a false but a wholly impossible 
explanation. The nation has not resolved-and should not-even 
the fundamental question whether elected representatives 
"should" reflect the views of their constituents or should instead 
act in what they consider the best interests of the polity as a 
whole. That question, put pristinely by 18th Century theorists, is 
greatly complicated in American practice by the work of politi-
cal parties, interest groups, and many organizations that mediate 
the views of constituents on their way to the legislature. But 
even if it were clear that representatives are expected simply to 
vote in accordance with their constituents' wishes, outcomes 
would hardly reflect simple majority sentiment: for example, 
outcomes depend on which questions are put to a vote, and how 
the questions are defined, and in what order they are taken up 
(all of which depend on distinctly non-majoritarian processes); 
and outcomes also depend on what legislative trades the repre-
sentatives are allowed to make. Moreover, of course, since the 
beginning of the Republic, the composition of both national and 
state legislatures has been determined not only by votes but by 
the boundaries of legislative districts drawn with a keen eye to 
the desired election outcomes. And, as we have been repeatedly 
reminded, the President need not be elected by a majority or 
plurality of all voters. 
Bennett does not, in my view, sufficiently criticize one im-
portant consequence of naive vote-centered majoritarianism that 
has a bearing on much of what he does say. In 1964, the Supreme 
Court established a high-water mark for the naive theory by im-
posing a strict "one-man [sic] one-vote" standard on the appor-
tionment of both the U.S. House of Representatives4 and state 
legislatures. 5 The Court seems to have thought that giving each 
4. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) ("as nearly as practicable, one 
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's"). 
5. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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resident (not, incidentally, each eligible voter) an equal theoreti-
cal fraction of a legislator would work some democratic magic, 
and it therefore required frequent redrawing of district lines to 
make districts as nearly equal as other constraints allow. 
In this, the Court largely ignored the problem it has since 
found intractable and which a plurality of Justices have now 
formally given up on solving: the actual composition of the re-
sulting legislature depends on how the district lines are drawn 
and who is grouped with whom.6 Equally important, the 1964 
Court largely overlooked the fact that geographic line drawing is 
itself a process full of political opportunities, and that everyone 
involved is quite capable of calculating the consequences of each 
proposed map with some precision. One result of the Court's in-
sistence on repeated redistricting to produce numerical equali-
ties (and disregard of the politics of actually drawing the lines) is 
the present rigid and deep division of the House of Representa-
tives. Forty years of party trading of safe districts in the mapping 
process have meant that very few seats are now in play in any 
election, and many seats are safely in the hands of one party and 
occupied by persons whose views are partisan enough to win a 
primary rather than flexible enough to win a contested general 
election. 
Bennett is persuasive that giving each citizen an equal influ-
ence, through her vote, is pretty far from what American democ-
racy is about, and he offers a much more convincing and inter-
esting explanation of our particular democracy and its long 
survival: we are engaged in a complex public "conversation" 
about public affairs. Government in America is structured so as 
to give leaders a wide range of opportunities and obligations to 
engage with overlapping constituencies about subjects of con-
cern, and to give citizens a sense that they are being spoken to 
and listened to. The federal system with its boldface division of 
responsibility among different levels of government; separate 
elections of the executive at both the national and state levels; 
bicameral legislatures with different geographically defined con-
stituencies electing individual members (rather than propor-
tional representation of parties as in many other democracies); 
~irst Amendment protection of robust debate on matters of pub-
he concern; even the Supreme Court's practice of publishing dis-
senting opinions (which by definition are contrary to the law as 
the Supreme Court is declaring it)-all these features create a 
6. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004). 
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deliberate complexity that forces leaders to explain their views 
to different sets of the public, gives members of the public many 
qualitatively different opportunities to respond (at the polls and 
otherwise), and helps citizens feel engaged in their government. 
Bennett identifies four theoretical problems for which 
"conversationalism" provides an interesting explanation: 
1. Why doesn't much of anyone seriously object to giving 
each state two Senators? From an apportionment perspective, 
the U.S. Senate is of course a monstrosity. The fraction of a 
Senator that a resident of Wyoming "enjoys" is about 50 times 
the fraction enjoyed by a Californian. So why does (almost) no-
body ever argue that the Senate is so seriously "undemocratic" 
that we ought to amend the Constitution to change it? Does eve-
ryone simply assume that the civics-class story of the Great 
Compromise between the big states and the little states resolved 
the issue for all time? When we amended the Constitution to 
take the selection of Senators away from the state legislatures 
and give it to the people of each state, why was there no serious 
suggestion of changing the apportionment as well (pp. 49-65)? 
2. Why do we count children under 18 for apportionment 
purposes (as we do- apportionment is based on total popula-
tion) but fail to reflect them in any way in the voting process? 
From a vote-centered standpoint, there is a serious logical incon-
sistency. The percentage of children in the population actually 
varies a good deal from state to state and between districts 
within states. As a result, each eligible voter's "fraction" of a 
Congressman or legislator actually varies far more than the Su-
preme Court deemed allowable in the reapportionment cases, to 
the detriment of voters in places with lots of children. (And, de-
pending on your perspective, the interests of the children and 
their families are systematically underrepresented, with the re-
sult that there is much more political focus, for example, on the 
welfare of senior citizens than the welfare of children.) Nobody 
advocates giving actual votes to five-year-olds, but if they are to 
count as part of a district's population, presumably because their 
interests ought to be reflected in national and state decisions, 
why not give their parents or guardians an extra vote on their 
behalf? And why has almost nobody ever seriously suggested 
such a thing (pp. 67-84)? 
Bennett's answer to these two puzzles is that the existing 
rules reflect a "conversational" expectation that is far more im-
portant than any principle of apportionment. The composition of 
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the Senate creates a group of legislators who speak to and re-
spond to constituencies that are defined differently from (but 
overlap with) the constituencies that elect the House of Repre-
sentatives, giving each citizen qualitatively different opportuni-
ties to be addressed and participate in public processes. Children 
count but do not vote because the conversation, in which voting 
is a chief means of expression for ordinary citizens, is an adult 
process. From a conversational perspective, these features that 
seem anomalous on a vote-centered model make a good deal of 
sense. 
Whether particular features of our government foster con-
versation is of course debatable. A current example is the Elec-
toral College, which, perhaps curiously, has never been the sub-
ject of strong or sustained popular objections, even though it 
means that the President is not elected by majority vote of the 
populace as a whole. A "conversational" explanation of the ac-
ceptance of the Electoral College might be that it has forced 
presidential candidates to focus on issues that concern the States 
as such, and to seek votes in places other than the major popula-
tion centers where they might otherwise spend their entire cam-
paigns. On the other hand, in the current election, the Electoral 
College structure appears to be causing the candidates to focus 
on "swing states" to the partial exclusion of large areas of the 
country. But either way, Bennett's question-Does the institu-
tion foster a sense of communication and engagement between 
the President and the various parts of a large country?- is surely 
one useful way to think about the institution. 
3. Why do so many people vote? Given the effort involved, 
the lost opportunity to spend an hour or two more enjoyably or 
profitably, and the exceedingly small chance that any individ-
ual's vote will alter the outcome, going to vote is not rational if 
outcome-altering is the only value an individual sees. (The more 
usual question, of course, is "Why don't more people vote?" but 
Bennett says correctly that if individuals are guided by rational 
self-interest the answer to that question is easy: it is not worth 
the effort.) As Bennett notes, modern "rational choice" theorists 
have identified the problem of why people vote and labeled it a 
"paradox" but have had difficulty solving it (pp. 106-15). 
The "conversational" answer to the question is straightfor-
ward. What a citizen "gets" from voting is not primarily or even 
significantly his own percentage chance of changing the outcome 
but rather an opportunity to respond to what the voter has heard 
from the candidates. Voting viewed in this way is a central act in 
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a participatory process of communication between governors 
and governed. The rewards of this form of participation still are 
not sufficient to induce half of the eligible population to vote, 
but they account nicely for the half that does. 
4. Why does it bother constitutional scholars that the Su-
preme Court is allowed to strike down federal and state legisla-
tion? Bennett's remaining problem is of a different kind. He be-
gins with what Alexander Bickel called the "countermajoritarian" 
difficulty in justifying the Supreme Court's power of judicial re-
view. Why, in a democracy, do we allow an unelected Court to in-
voke the Constitution and invalidate the work of an elected Con-
gress? Bickel went so far as to call judicial review "a deviant 
institution in the American democracy," asserting that a determi-
nation that a law is unconstitutional "thwarts the will of represen-
tatives of the actual people of the here and now" and acts against 
"the prevailing majority."7 
Part of the answer to that question, Bennett says, is that the 
notion that the stricken law represented the will of "the prevail-
ing majority" is largely a myth and, on the other hand, courts are 
certainly not immune to the influence of political processes. 
Laws are enacted (or not) by complex processes at several re-
moves from any popular vote and need not closely reflect a pre-
vailing popular majority, and courts, conversely, are subject to 
various political constraints including the manner of their selec-
tion. One can describe the President, Congress, the administra-
tive agencies (which make important parts of the law), and the 
federal courts as all parts of a process that is ultimately respon-
sive to "the governed," without any of the parts being either 
purely democratic or purely "deviant." 
But Bennett sees good reasons why Bickel's "counterma-
joritarian difficulty" continues to haunt constitutional theorists 
even when they recognize (as Bickel himself surely did) that 
simple majoritarianism is a myth. He suggests that one source of 
these misgivings about the Supreme Court's power of judicial 
review is that it is "counterconversational." The very limits on 
the Supreme Court's activities that make its role tolerable-the 
Constitution's insistence that it may decide only concrete cases 
presented to it by particular litigants-mean that the Court 
sometimes makes sweeping legal doctrine in cases where only a 
handful of people have been heard, depriving everyone else of 
7. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 16, 17-18 (1962). 
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the right to be part of that particular area of the national conver-
sation. Bennett thus offers one interesting explanation of why 
Bickel's problem is a problem at all (pp. 85-105). 
At several places, Bennett insists at some length that his 
"conversational" approach is intended to be descriptive only, to 
"account for" many facts of American democracy without judg-
ing the results (e.g., pp. 117-21). I am not sure why he so firmly 
resists normative judgments, or that it is possible to be "descrip-
tive only." Bennett is not (most of the time) arguing that the de-
sire to facilitate conversation was the historical cause of a par-
ticular democratic feature. The point of his "description" -what 
he is "accounting for"-is why Americans broadly continue to 
find particular features of our democracy desirable, or at least 
acceptable, and why that democracy has now persisted for a long 
time. But when the subject is the features of a form of democ-
ratic government, popular acceptance and long survival sound to 
me like normative criteria. I hope Bennett will turn to using his 
conversational approach to think about what now works and 
what does not. 
That would certainly be timely, because we are in a testing 
period for the national conversation, which has lost some of its 
necessary, built-in complexity and tolerance and become increas-
ingly two-sided and shrill. The reasons for this range from the 
fact that the communications revolution has made it easier to 
rally citizens at opposite poles, to the spread of safe seats in the 
House of Representatives through reapportionment, to the per-
sonalities of our recent Presidents. But we now (as this is writ-
ten) have a President who speaks very effectively to just-under 
half of the population and fails quite dramatically to reach the 
other just-under half; a rigidly divided Congress that finds com-
promise excessively difficult, and a population increasingly split 
into two groups that distrust each other. I don't want to stray too 
far beyond my subject, but we are in some danger, it seems to 
me, of having our huge democracy divide into something resem-
bling the stable factions that Madison feared in a smaller and 
simpler context.8 It was that fear, surely, that produced some of 
the features of American democracy that were intended to com-
plicate our national conversation by requiring holders of various 
office_s to speak and respond to a great variety of overlapping 
constituencies and groups, creating many opportunities for par-
8. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 122-23 (James Madison) (Penguin Books 1987) 
(1788). 
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ticipation, dialogue, and tradeoffs among intensely felt interests, 
and producing some tolerance born of an appreciation of com-
plexity. This seems like a good time to think hard about how 
well our institutions are actually working from the conversa-
tional perspective. 
